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Abstract: The problem of ontology includes the problem of how being is determinate and has 
sense, i.e., orientations, meanings, differences that make a difference. This paper explores the 
thought that being’s sense stems from an ‘ontological chirality,’ a kind of ontological difference 
with characteristics kin to differences between left and right hands. The paper first shows how 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of reversibility leads to issues of chirality. Results in chemistry, 
biology and geometry are then discussed to illuminate the importance of chiral differences and to 
develop a definition of ontological chirality that connects with an ontology of sense.  
 
 
Being is. But being is also something, it is 
determinate. The problem of ontology is not 
only or so much saying how it is that being 
is, but how it is that being is determinate: 
how being has orientations, senses, 
meanings, differences that make a 
difference, rather than being an indifferent 
blank void of all sensible determinations. 
This paper explores the thought that being’s 
sense stems from an ‘ontological chirality,’ 
a kind of ontological difference with 
characteristics kin to differences between 
left and right hands. The concept of 
reversibility in Merleau-Ponty’s later 
ontology led me to this thought, so I begin 
by briefly showing how chirality lurks 
within reversibility—especially in a relation 
between activity and passivity that is crucial 
to reversibility. I then discuss results in 
chemistry, biology and geometry to 
illuminate the importance of chiral 
differences and to develop a definition of 
ontological chirality that connects with an 
ontology of sense.  
Reversibility, a concept central to Merleau-
Ponty’s later works “Eye and Mind” (OE) 
and The Visible and the Invisible (VI),1 
indicates both a relational structure and its 
ontology. For Merleau-Ponty the perceiver 
and the perceived in general are reversible. 
He often illustrates this with touch. To say 
that the toucher and touched are reversible is 
to say that in virtue of being a being who 
can touch something I am inherently also a 
being who can be touched.2 Being touched is 
thus an inherent reverse or flip side of 
touching, it is its lining (“doublure”3). But 
Merleau-Ponty goes further than this: the 
fact that my active touching inherently 
reverses to passive thingliness means that 
“the world is made of the same stuff” (OE 
19/163) or ““element”” (VI 184/140) as the 
body. Strangely, this also implies that active 
touching is an inherent reverse side of being 
passively touched, and not merely in my 
body: things have an active sense that is the 
reverse of the passive sensing they prompt 
in me; without this affiliation between my 
body and things, I could make no sense of 
them.4 This echoes Merleau-Ponty’s earlier 
effort to root perception in a pre-personal 
field of sensibility.5  
The phenomenon of reversibility thus 
indicates an ontological complicity between 
the perceiver and the perceived, between the 
active and the passive, the inside and the 
outside, and so on. Crucially, this complicity 
never reduces the differences between 
reversible terms: touching never coincides 
with being touched (VI 194-5/147-8), 
activity and passivity must remain 
incongruent if perception is to do its work—
a crucial point that Merleau-Ponty is 
working out in his later ontology and study 
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of passivity.6 Nonetheless, the peculiar 
relation between reversible terms is such 
that they can reverse to one another: the 
toucher can itself reverse to being touched.  
Let us think about the relational 
structure and ontology of reversible terms. 
These are not related like reverse sides of an 
LP record. First, while LP sides always 
come back to back, each side is determined 
by information with its own independent 
structure. So changing a side into its reverse 
involves stamping new information on the 
record from the outside, rather than the sort 
of internal convulsion through which a 
touching hand itself reverses into a touched 
hand. LP sides lack the ontological 
complicity of toucher and touched as 
themselves reversing into one another. 
Second, on the other hand, LP sides are too 
much made of the “same stuff.” In the vinyl 
and information of the two LP sides, we find 
nothing like the irreducible difference 
between toucher and touched. 
The ontological relation between 
reversible terms is closer in kin to that 
between right- and left- hands or gloves. 
(Note that our concern here is the sort of 
glove that cannot be indifferently fit on 
either hand.) Kant calls such figures 
“incongruent counterparts”7; in geometry 
each such figure is called an enantiomorph.8 
What is distinctive of an enantiomorphs, is 
that there is no rotation or translation that 
will superpose it on its mirror image; a 
square or circle can be translated (moved in 
the plane) or rotated so that it exactly 
superposes on, occupies the place of, its 
mirror image, but a glove cannot. Like 
enantiomorphs, toucher and touched are 
incongruent because the one cannot be 
reduced to or take the place of the other; 
they are counterpart so far as they are made 
of the same stuff and are inherently 
complicitous. Yet a right-hand glove can 
reverse to its left-hand “incongruous 
counterpart” when it is turned inside out. 
When turned inside out, the blue, right-hand 
dish-glove, lined inside with white flocking, 
turns to a left-hand, white-flocked glove, 
lined with blue rubber. (The reader may 
want to try this at home.)  
Reversibility implies a similar latitude 
within being itself, wherein being, by an 
internal convulsive operation (like being 
turned inside out) reverses from perceiver to 
perceived. Since the perceiver and perceived 
are made of the same stuff, their divergence 
(écart) into incongruent counterparts must 
be accomplished by such an internal 
operation. The perceiver and the perceived 
are thus two different, incongruent 
‘inflections’ of being. (Crucially, they are 
not two different appearances of one being; 
the point behind this is subtle, so it is left for 
a note.9) Geometrical enantiomorphs, such 
as hands, but also enantiomorphic 
molecules, forces, or organisms, exhibit 
handedness or chirality, a term introduced 
into chemistry by Lord Kelvin, who draws it 
from the Greek cheir, for hand.10  
Merleau-Ponty suggests a link between 
chirality, reversibility and écart in several 
places. One especially relevant passage is in 
a working note that begins “Reversibility: 
the finger of the glove that is turned inside 
out.” (VI 317/263)11 While its topic is 
inside-out, not left-right, reversibility, the 
passage’s point seems to be that the glove’s 
curvature internally indicates its reversibility 
into its incongruent counterpart, via what 
Merleau-Ponty calls “double 
representation.” This is to say that if we are 
looking at a glove that is right-side out, its 
curvature represents or indicates both the 
surface of the right-side out glove and of the 
inside out glove. Similarly, we could say 
that its curvature represents both the left-
hand glove and the right-hand glove. No 
outside standpoint is needed to grasp this 
reversibility—it is indicated right within the 
curvature of the glove. The ontological 
implication is that in virtue of reversibility, 
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being itself involves a kind of doubling or 
internal incongruence such that in its very 
unity, being is inflected with being two 
different ways.12  
This “double representation” also 
strikingly illustrates a key ontological 
insight of Merleau-Ponty, namely that the 
invisible is not an essence or idea beyond 
being, but is endogenous to, of visible being. 
Consider, once again, the blue, right-hand 
dish-glove, lined (doubled) with white 
flocking. If we turn it inside out, we will see 
a left-hand, white-flocked glove. Where is 
the left-hand, white glove when we are 
looking at the visible, blue, right-hand 
glove? It is invisible—yet also there in the 
visible glove. In saying this, I am drawing 
on an issue central to the debates about 
Kantian incongruent counterparts and 
enantiomorphs. It has to do with a difficulty 
of defining and grasping the determinacy of 
enantiomorphs in the first place, a difficulty 
to which we will return. Roughly put, the 
issue boils down to this: do the left- and 
right- hand gloves have the same shape, but 
with each shape having a different sense 
than the other? Or do they have different 
shapes?13 That is, are left- and right- hand 
gloves two different shapes, or two different 
‘flavours’ or senses of one shape? The issue 
is really quite difficult and subtle, for we 
seem to have to say “yes” to both 
questions—in somewhat the same the way 
that positing A=B entails both an identity 
and difference of A and B. For the left-hand 
glove is the incongruent counterpart of a 
right-hand glove, not of a shoe or a mitten, 
or a glove for seven fingered aliens, which 
suggests they do have the same shape; again, 
we precisely pair the left- and right- hand 
gloves because, as gloves, they share a 
shape. And yet, the gloves in the pair are not 
superposable on one another, and in this 
sense they have different and incongruent 
shapes. I do not propose to answer here the 
question of whether the difference between 
members of a chiral pair is a difference of 
shape, or of something else such as sense. 
Really, the answer being sought here is more 
about how to properly pose the question.  
With respect to double representation 
and the invisible of the visible, though, the 
question gets us to notice that the areas that 
make up the right-hand glove are 
topologically connected in a way that runs in 
parallel to the connectedness of areas that 
make up the left-hand glove. In this sense, at 
least, the gloves have the same shape. 
Indeed, you cannot have a right-hand glove 
‘shape’ without also implicitly having it 
lined with areas with the kind of 
connectedness that could show up as a left-
hand glove ‘shape’. Yet, that left-hand 
‘shape’ is invisible in the right-hand glove. 
It is there lining the right-hand glove, but 
you cannot see it as left-handed until the 
glove reverses from inside to out—and then 
the right-handedness of the glove becomes 
invisible in the visible. Of course, we should 
not think that the invisible of the visible, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontological sense, is the 
exactly the same as the left-hand glove’s 
invisibility in the right-hand glove. 
Nonetheless, this gives a powerful 
illustration of the logic at hand in Merleau-
Ponty’s ontology of the invisible  of the 
visible, and suggests a close proximity 
between reversibility and that ontology. 
The illustration also emphasizes the 
incongruity of members of a chiral pair, a 
kind of gap between them, a gap that is 
paradoxically central to their pairing and to 
reversibility. This gap is suggested by 
Merleau-Ponty in a passage where he 
himself discusses chirality. Asking us to 
“[c]onsider the right, the left,” and, referring 
to Kant’s discussion of incongruent 
counterparts, he writes that the “two” parts 
of such pairs announce “a fragmentation of 
being” that is “the possibility for 
discrimination” and “the advent of 
difference.” (VI 270/216-7) This reinforces 
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the point that an incongruence between 
reversible terms is crucial to Merleau-Ponty.    
 Indeed, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the 
seer and seen as “mirror arrangements” (VI 
192/146), and, in a discussion of the 
incongruence of the toucher and touched, 
connects this with the phenomenon of the 
relation between the body and its specular 
image in a mirror (VI 303/249).  This point 
about the specular image is repeated in a 
discussion of the divergence between 
toucher and touched, after a remark that 
“flesh is a mirror phenomenon” (VI 
309/255-6). And in the nature lectures he 
writes of the touched and touching hand that 
“they are the mirror of each other,” and 
there “is something analogous in the relation 
with things.”14 And of course reversibility is 
most often illustrated with the example of 
the left hand’s act of touching (when it 
touches the right hand) reversing to a 
passive being touched; that is, this reversal 
is taking place between chiral counterparts. 
Finally, we should remember that Merleau-
Ponty draws his term “chiasm” from the 
peculiar cross-over of optical nerves from 
the body’s left and right sides.  
The above gives strong evidence that 
the theme of chirality is not far from 
Merleau-Ponty’s mind when he is thinking 
about reversibility. The thought I am 
pursuing here is that reversibility and chiasm 
in fact imply chirality, a kind of difference 
that, as we shall see, is fundamentally—
perhaps ontologically—different than other 
differences. To be a bit more precise, the 
thought here is that being exhibits 
reversibility, écart and sense in virtue of 
being chiral—in the relevant ontological 
sense developed below.  
Put otherwise, The Visible and the 
Invisible seeks a new and heretofore 
unnamed element of being, called flesh. (VI 
193/147) Flesh is novel in engendering 
sense within itself, rather than being 
senseless matter or requiring transcendent 
senses introduced from without. Flesh 
engenders sense through écart and 
chiasmatic reversibility. The point so far is 
that this involves chirality. The thought I 
explore is that this means that the difference 
elemental to being is not, for example, a 
difference between exclusive opposites, like 
being and nothing, but a difference with 
characteristics echoing the peculiarities of 
chirality. To better understand the 
philosophical significance and peculiarity of 
chirality, I survey results showing how 
chirality is pervasive in our universe and 
fundamental to life and sense. These results 
repeatedly lead to problems about chirality 
that point to its peculiarity and let me 
develop an ontological understanding of the 
term.  
That chirality might have deep 
philosophical significance should not be 
surprising, for Kant inaugurates modern 
studies of chirality by arguing that the left-
right difference has implications for the 
nature of space.15 It might seem, though, that 
geometrical or spatial differences are too 
formal to illuminate anything like 
ontological differences. But enantiomers—
molecules that are chemically identical 
except for the chiral arrangement of their 
atoms—are pervasive in nature, and 
molecular chirality can make the difference 
between drug and poison. While the 
right-hand enantiomer of Thalidomide 
tempers morning sickness, its left-hand 
version causes mutations; disastrously, in a 
molecular echo of Derrida’s point about 
pharmakon,16 the human body can reverse 
the right-hand cure delivered in the 
pharmacist’s pill into the left-hand poison.  
Enantiomers, and more specifically, 
homochirality, a bias toward left- or right- 
hand versions of enantiomers of given 
molecules, are in fact crucial to life.17 
Pasteur, who is the one who discovered that 
molecules have asymmetry and also that 
living organisms selectively consume 
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molecules according to the chirality of their 
asymmetry, thought that only living things 
could produce homochirality, and that this 
discovery allowed for a “well marked line of 
demarcation…between the chemistry of 
living matter and the chemistry of dead 
matter.”18 Just as Bergson writes that 
“[w]herever anything lives, there is, open 
somewhere, a register in which time is being 
inscribed”19 we could say that wherever 
there is life, there is bias. In terrestrial life 
forms, the bias is such that amino acids are 
in left form (with few exceptions20), while 
sugars are mostly in right.21 Interestingly, 
physicist Gideon Gilat22 argues that chiral 
molecules are of evolutionary advantage, 
since their energetic interface with the world 
sets up temporally irreversible processes 
crucial to life, that is, in homochiral vs. 
other sorts of molecular populations, it is 
more likely that chemical reactions will go 
in one direction only (e.g., components 
binding into products, but not products 
breaking down into components), which 
means that detecting the products (vs. 
components) of chemical reactions gives a 
measure of time passing (the components 
are in the past of the product). This would 
mean that the Bergsonian inscription of time 
and chiral bias are connected.  
Homochirality on the micro level 
inflects its way upward: helices and fibres 
formed from chiral molecules twist in one 
direction only; so seemingly symmetrical 
muscles on opposites sides of the body in 
fact have fibers that twist in the same 
direction, which means that our bodies in 
fact have a deep geometrical asymmetry (the 
muscle fibres in your left and right arms 
spiral in the same direction, so on this level, 
your left and right sides are not mirror 
images of one another).23 Strangely too, 
there are drugs that effect one side of the 
body more than the other, suggesting that 
between the sides of our body there may be 
“subtle molecular differences” left over 
from embryogenesis.24  
Indeed, molecular chirality and animal 
asymmetry are linked phenomena. Most 
animals exhibit bilateral or radial symmetry 
(although radial symmetry is really bilateral 
‘underneath’, as in the starfish). But animal 
symmetry is pervasively broken by 
asymmetries on various levels. Humans 
exhibit left- or right- handedness and brain 
lateralization, and our hair parts to one side. 
Some animals exhibit asymmetric patterns 
on their surfaces, and some crabs develop 
oversized claws on just one side. Many 
snails have shells spiralling in just one 
direction typical of the species, and hermit 
crabs specialized to inhabit the shells of 
such species have muscles that 
asymmetrically twist their bodies to fit the 
shells. Beneath outer symmetry, our internal 
organs are asymmetric and asymmetrically 
placed relative to one another—and these 
asymmetries are crucial to the function of 
organs and the body as a whole.25 
Disturbances of these asymmetries, such as 
dextrocardia (placement of the heart on the 
left), heterotaxia (where each organ 
independently decides its situs) or 
isomerisms (where organs are symmetrical) 
are associated with physiological 
difficulties. The only exception to such 
difficulties is situs inversus, a complete 
mirror-image reversal of all asymmetrical 
organs and pairings.26  
We should also note that in animal and 
other motion, asymmetrical postures are key 
to action, something artists know, since 
symmetrical form reflects stasis, repose, 
passivity, even death, whilst asymmetry 
reflect instability, motion, action, life. This 
is also true at a physiological level: muscles 
contract by what amounts to a one way 
ratcheting of molecules, blood moves back 
to the heart in virtue of one-way valves in 
veins. Life is a phenomenon of one way 
directedness, of sense, which Aristotle 
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points out in his considerations of desire as 
an orexis that stretches toward things.27 
Asymmetry is endemic to life and 
arguably crucial to it. But how are the 
directions of  asymmetries determined? Life 
entails that amino-acids end up being folded 
just one way, that the heart be on one side 
only. But what determines that amino acids 
are levose and the heart on the left? Life 
might work just as well if hearts and amino 
acids had the opposite chirality, although 
perhaps life would not be quite so robust if 
these molecules and organs were 
indifferently distributed in left and right 
forms.  
Remembering that in geometry 
chirality gives incongruent figures a sense, 
and that Merleau-Ponty conceptualizes sens 
as a meaning inseparable from directedness 
of being28, what we are broaching here is a 
problem about the genesis of determinate 
sense, of basic determinate differences that, 
from within being, themselves indicate the 
difference they make.  
But on the molecular level, the 
problem here is the origin of what is called 
homochirality, of uniform chirality in 
enantiomer populations. Significantly, there 
is as yet no satisfactory answer to the 
problem, just suggestions that homochirality 
might first be coupled with very deep biases 
of our universe29 (to which we return); that 
organisms already dependent on 
homochirality can produce homochiral 
molecules; and that spontaneous production 
of homochirality depends on free energy 
inputs, processes that favour one enantiomer 
over another, and an initial excess, even if 
tiny, of one enantiomer type. Note the 
question begging here: homochiral 
asymmetry is explained only by appeal to 
existing asymmetries of molecules or energy 
distributions. Asymmetry goes ‘all the way 
down.’ 
This problem echoes on other levels. 
In embryology, it is one thing to account for 
asymmetry in the organism, quite another to 
account for the direction of asymmetry. The 
underlying problem is this: In animal 
embryos, establishment of the anterior-
posterior and dorsal-ventral axes entails 
establishment of the L-R axis. But 
establishment of the L-R axis does yet not 
determine which side of the axis is in fact 
the left, say, the side where we typically find 
the heart in human beings. It has long been 
known how exogenous cues can determine 
the anterior and dorsal ends of the other 
axes, for example, gravity can determine 
what is back vs. front, or the point at which 
the sperm is accepted into the egg can 
determine tail vs. head, but “no obvious 
macroscopic aspect of nature differentiates 
left from right.”30 So a process internal to 
the organism must make an in principle 
arbitrary, yet consistent, chiral determination 
of left vs. right, relative to anterior-posterior 
and dorsal-ventral determinations. While 
cascades of asymmetric molecules and 
asymmetric gene expressions at work in 
chiral determination have now been 
identified, for each such signal, “it is 
necessary to ask what determined its 
asymmetry,” and as of 2005, “no mechanism 
has been conclusively shown to initiate 
asymmetry.”31 
To understand the point that no 
obvious aspect of nature differentiates left 
from right, let us turn to a deeper level of the 
problem. We inherit this problem from Kant, 
but it is more easily put through a variant 
developed by the mathematician Martin 
Gardner, which is also resonant with the 
embryo problem. Imagine we are initiating 
communication with a remote, alien 
civilization, which Martin Gardner calls 
“Ozma.”32 Communication of pure 
information can let us establish the sense of 
our word up vs. down or front vs. back, 
because we can, for example, refer to 
universal gravitation, or transmit pictures of 
our bodies with front and back labelled. It 
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also lets us establish the difference between 
left and right. But it is impossible to 
establish33 in purely, abstract, ideal, 
discursive terms which end of the left-right 
axis is properly called left.34 For example, 
transmitting a picture of a human body with 
the left labelled will not work, for the 
transmission needs to be decoded, and 
absent an already shared chirality 
convention for determining left vs. right, the 
aliens could decode our picture as its mirror 
image. We cannot tell the aliens what is left 
vs. right, we can only show it. The universe, 
though, exhibits a peculiar asymmetry: some 
subatomic events are in effect 
asymmetrically biased; so we can 
circumvent the problem by telling the aliens 
how the universe itself shows our chirality 
convention.35 But this is just a remote 
showing, not a pure telling.  
Put in Kantian terms, this implies that 
determinate chirality—chiral sense—is an 
intuitive, not a discursive concept. Here we 
reach even deeper levels. Analysis of the 
problem of chirality determination suggests 
it is correlative with the problem of whether, 
for example, a hand, on its own and without 
reference to anything else, has chiral sense, 
or is achiral.36 Remember that Merleau-
Ponty thinks the glove itself shows chiral 
difference, insofar as it itself indicates its 
reverse. But this does not mean that the 
glove itself indicates whether it would be 
called “left” or “right” by we human beings, 
according to our conventions. It is easy to 
think that a glove or hand could of itself 
have, for example, a left-hand sense. But 
consider a two dimensional figure of a left 
hand; flipping it over in 3d space or walking 
around to see it from the other side reverses 
its sense to right. If the 2d hand is embedded 
in a 2d surface twisted in the manner of a 
Möbius strip, rigid movement of the hand 
along the surface similarly reverses its 
sense. A 2d space connected in this twisted 
way is called non-orientable: there are no 
figures in it that of themselves have chiral 
sense. Soon after Kant made his claims 
about incongruent counterparts, Möbius and 
others realized that a 3d left hand rotated 
through a 4d space would reverse to a right 
hand. For a being with a 4d perspective, 3d 
hands lack chiral sense. 3d and 2d hands 
have chiral sense only because they are 
embedded in an orientable space, or are 
locally orientable via perspectival relations 
to those making sense of them from within 
such spaces.37  
The above suggests that chemically 
and biologically, chiral sense is vital to life 
and might depend on an elemental 
asymmetry or sense of nature. On a deeper 
level, chiral sense cannot be determined 
discursively but only intuitively, and shows 
itself only in spaces that are orientable or 
oriented by finite perspectives.38  
These points about reversibility and 
chirality let me develop a definition of 
ontological chirality. At the ontological level 
chirality has nothing to do with shape or 
direction as such. Rather, I define 
ontological chirality as a difference of being 
that is marked by certain characteristics, 
namely: the difference is between terms that 
are ontologically counterpart, incongruent, 
yet reversible; the sense of the difference 
(specifying which side of it is which) cannot 
be determined by pure ideas but can only 
show itself; this showing depends on the 
difference arising through a kind of internal 
spread of being, that is, sense is not 
localizable in punctiform points or locally 
bounded regions, but is chirally distributed 
across reversible terms in different locales; 
our access to this sense-showing is 
inherently perspectival, dependent on our 
internality to the very being that shows 
difference; and such a difference is senseless 
for-us and in-itself if it is abstracted from 
being or ‘viewed from above,’ in the way 
that a hand lacks chiral sense in higher 
dimensional spaces.  
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Here we should note that ontological 
chirality is no longer being understood as a 
phenomenon of an homogeneous, isotropic 
space, but of oriented, heterogeneous spaces 
with their own measure or curvature, which 
might be better understood in terms of 
place—but the point at issue is perhaps 
rather that place has its origin in a cosmos 
that is ontologically chiral (without chirality, 
no place).39 Notice also that such chiral 
difference involves an endogenous sense 
waiting to become express: since a chiral 
difference is inherently coupled (paired) in 
its very difference to other differences, it 
internally includes the ‘standard’ by which 
difference makes a difference. That is, such 
a difference echoes différance, insofar as 
différance involves the genesis of a kind of 
difference that is also generative of the 
difference by which it makes a difference. 
And, like différance, chiral difference is 
neither a concept (since it is intuitive, not 
discursive) nor purely an intuition, because 
it is never immediately given in a single 
intuition, and becomes express only through 
a further context generated along with it, and 
so requires a division or rhythm in which, 
for example, we double back on—and 
thence mediate—the two gloves given in 
intuition as: like but unlike one another. 
Really, the pairing of the gloves itself 
mediates their chiral differentiation, a self-
mediation or differentiation that traces the 
logic of Merleau-Ponteian expression. 
Again, since chiral difference is delocalized, 
not ever posited in some terminal, 
punctiform thing, it is inherently open 
ended, deferred—but deferred not merely 
temporally, but spatially through the spread 
of being. Here we might recall some notes 
on dynamic morphology by Merleau-Ponty, 
transcribed by Barbaras (2001), that suggest 
that the identity of an element such as 
sulphur has to do with an affinity between 
spread out instances of sulphur, rather than 
some abstract essence of sulphur being 
instantiated in multiple localizable points—
the determinacy of sulphur is a function of a 
more primordial spread of being. So we 
would have to say that chiral difference is 
also different than différance since it is a 
function of spread, not repetition and 
deferring—but perhaps the chiral spread of 
difference is also linked to the deferring of 
différance, if we remember the coupling 
flagged above between chiral bias and 
temporal inscription.  
Examples of ontological chirality that 
come to mind are… the differences between 
perceiver and perceived, or the active and 
passive. This may sound strange, for it 
seems that such differences are so 
fundamentally clear that we could, for 
example, tell rather than show them to Ozma 
aliens. But I wonder whether this is so. An 
obvious strategy is to tell the aliens the 
difference between active vs. passive by 
sending a picture of a hand touching 
something, with the touching hand labelled 
active… but here reversibility confuses 
things: the touching hand is also passive. 
And such telling presumes experience of the 
body as a centre of agency. But there are 
people here on Earth who feel themselves 
being touched when another person’s 
shoulder is touched;40 children do not 
always feel their agency as limited to their 
bodies; and we can be made to feel a rubber 
hand as part of our body.41 Also, when 
working together we feel active in others,42 a 
point that Merleau-Ponty captures in his 
description of watching a soccer game in 
such a way as to feel involved/moving with 
what is going on with the players.43 Telling 
aliens/others the active-passive difference 
likely presumes shared experiences of 
bodily feeling and agency, for example, the 
feeling that hammering a nail is active (vs. a 
passive enslavement to things), or that death 
is suffering (rather than liberation). Are 
these necessarily universal?  
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Perhaps physics can us get out of this, 
but introducing a true active-passive 
distinction into physics requires something 
like an absolute distinction between motion 
and rest, which requires reference to a 
Husserlian Boden—which may, again, not 
be universal (in the sense that what counts as 
Boden may not be universal, even though 
the ‘need’ for Boden is).44 Indeed, it seems 
to me that one of Newton’s key innovations, 
and one that is central to modern physics, is 
to remove the need for an irreducibly basic 
distinction between passivity and activity, 
since, famously, for Newton, rest is not an 
independent phenomenon with its own 
explanation, as it is for Aristotle. Once 
Newton has the idea of inertia, and of the 
interrelation between acceleration, mass and 
force, the problem is not explaining how 
things stay at rest or keeping moving, but 
what accounts for a change between motion 
and rest, but for such an account to be 
possible, motion and rest must be seen as 
belonging to one continuum, with rest 
simply as a zero point of motion, which 
removes a sharp distinction between motion 
and rest, and thence between activity and 
passivity.45 Whether something is active or 
passive, in motion or at rest, is relative to the 
selected frameworks of measurement. And 
as of yet I haven’t come across a way of 
capturing the active-passive distinction in 
purely mathematical/physical terms, without 
reducing activity to passivity or vice versa.  
The thought here is that we cannot get 
past these problems, or, correlatively, to the 
genesis of sense, without some kind of 
already given chiral difference. No abstract 
telling can communicate ontological 
chirality—but it can be expressed, in virtue 
of a chirality already shown by being.46  
Now I think that ontological chirality 
as defined above resonates with 
reversibility, chiasm, écart, the need for 
interrogating being from within—and 
Merleau-Ponty’s effort to find an expressive 
sense within being. The thought broached 
here is that all of these require an elemental 
ontological chirality, a sort of ontological 
differential architecture internal to being, 
that spreads out being in such a way that this 
very spread fissions into sensible 
differences, that elaborate themselves so as 
to contingently become express.  
To cast this concluding thought a 
different way, with a cast of Husserl’s die: 
Husserl’s choice of the die-phenomenon (as 
one of his favourite examples) is probably 
not arbitrary, given what he asks us to notice 
in it. A die is easily held in hand or in view, 
so its tactile-kinaesthetic and visual horizons 
are easily explored on various registers 
(noetic, noematic, internal, external, etc.). 
The faces of the die are numbered, which 
makes it easy to name its various perceptual 
profiles and thence discursively describe its 
horizon structure (contrast trying to do this 
with a blank cube, or a sphere). The 
numbering of the faces, and the die’s cubic 
shape, also bring the die into proximity with 
ideal objects that we may wish to study. 
Finally, dice are mass-manufactured to 
exacting standards, to precisely be as alike 
qua dice as possible—the movie Ocean’s 
Thirteen47 nicely illustrates the legalities of 
the manufacturing apparatus behind this and 
what’s at stake in this exacting invariance 
for the gambling industry. The die example 
thus builds in a strong invariance across 
variant instances, such that we Earthly 
phenomenologists, when following Husserl, 
need not be preoccupied48 with possible 
differences between what we individual 
phenomenologists are touching or seeing; 
rather, we can focus on what Husserl is 
asking us to notice, namely that the sense 
“die,” “real die,” “imagined die,” and so on, 
rests in the horizonal structure of flowing 
perceptual profiles immanent within 
transcendentally reduced experience. 
Further, the die, insofar as it is a mass-
manufactured object, builds in a reference to 
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an inter-monadic community through which 
alone we find a sense of “true die,” 
“objective die,” “real die,” “exactingly 
manufactured die,” and so on.49 
Now let us perform, in Husserlian 
manner, an imaginative variation, extending 
our inter-monadic community from Earthly 
phenomenologists to phenomenologists in 
the alien civilization Ozma that Martin 
Gardner has us imagine. Here an important 
fact about dice comes into play: they are 
chiral. Gardner draws this point to our 
attention. Modern dice, the kind that are 
mass manufactured and used in casinos and 
games are all left-handed (according to our 
convention of left vs. right). What does this 
mean? Suppose we want to communicate to 
our Ozma counterpart the sense: “left-hand 
die.” It’s easy enough to specify the sense 
“die”: communicating what numbers, 
squares, cubes mean is easy enough, and we 
can send pictures that help with this. We can 
also send pictures showing we how arrange 
dots to indicate the numbering of die faces. 
And we can say that a real die is such that 
the numbering on opposite sides adds up to 
seven, and the one, two, and three, faces 
share edges and a corner. This constrains the 
construction of dice by our Ozma 
counterparts. But given this constraint there 
are still two different ways to produce a die. 
Take a die, place it on your desk with the 
one-face on top, and the two- and three- 
faces facing you. You will notice that if you 
point to the one-, two- and three- faces in 
ascending order, your hand moves from the 
one-face, down to the two-face on the left, 
and then up to the three-face toward the 
right; your hand circles around in counter-
clockwise fashion. This is behind our 
convention of calling our real dice left-
handed. If the faces were numbered in the 
opposite way, we could call the die right-
handed. Someone aware of this fact about 
dice could say of the right-handed die: “it’s 
not a real die, it’s a trick die, or a fraudulent 
die.” The question here is how could we 
communicate the sense “real, left-handed 
die” to our Ozma counter-part—or ourselves 
constitute the sense “left-handed die” from 
within the field of transcendentally reduced 
experience, given our awareness of this 
imaginative variation.  
The argument above is that we cannot 
constitute the sense of “left-handed die” 
within the field of transcendentally reduced 
experience, unless it, and thence the 
phenomenon of being, already exhibits 
certain characteristics that I tried to capture 
under the heading of ontological chirality. 
To put it in Husserlian terms: In his later 
work, specifically “The Origin of 
Geometry,” Husserl shows how the sense 
“triangle” has its genesis in historical 
processes of writing-down that take place in 
the life-world. My point is that our sense 
“left-handed die” has its genesis in a kind of 
“writing-down” that operates on a much 
deeper and pre-personal level, before human 
scripts, anterior to the life-world as human 
life-world: it depends on a certain operation 
of being that operates in advance of factual 
life, organismic life, human life, an 
operation that engenders being as chiral, that 
enables life to generate itself as chiral, that 
inscribes life with chirality. I am suggesting 
that this sort of operation belongs to what 
Merleau-Ponty hints at when he speaks of a 
“creative operation” (PhP 74/61) 
endogenous to the phenomenal field.50  
But even this creative operation is not 
enough, for determining which of an already 
generated chiral pair is to be called “left” 
would also need the writing-down that 
Husserl writes about, via shared history of 
encounters with reference to a shared being 
encountered, to a shared life-world; pure 
communication of abstract information 
would not suffice. Put otherwise, we and our 
Ozma counterpart can only communicate 
regarding the determinate sense of chirality, 
if a shared being that already operates in 
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generating chiral sense in a common life-
world, and a shared history of writing-down, 
of encounter in the life-world, determinately 
articulates chiral sense as this or that, left or 
right, active or passive, and so on.  
The deeper issue here is that this 
creative operation, and what allows for 
chiral sense, is an ontological chirality that 
cannot be secured or captured in advance by 
any sort of abstract analysis. It is radically 
contingent. Sense depends on an ontological 
differential architecture internal to being. 
But that architecture is not provable in 
advance, it is a contingent expression of 
being that has to with a future yet-to-come. 
The genesis of sense rests ‘in’ a throw of a 
die (Würfel), but it is thrown by no one, 
from nowhere, toward nothing—and yet it 
lands some place, some place that makes 
sense, and creates more sense to come. Yet 
for Merleau-Ponty, it is somehow ‘in’ being 
itself, although as a yet-to-come, to throw 
itself to sense.  
                                                                                      
1 References to “Eye and Mind” are given in 
the form OE [pg# in Merleau-Ponty 
(1964b)]/[pg# in Merleau-Ponty (1964a)]. 
References to The Visible and the Invisible 
are given in the form VI [pg# in Merleau-
Ponty (1964c)]/[pg# in Merleau-Ponty 
([1964] 1968)]. References to the 
Phenomenology are given in the form PhP 
pg# Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1962). 
2 There are complications here, given that 
Merleau-Ponty illustrates this reversibility of 
touch not only with the relation between the 
body and things, but with the relation 
between the body and itself, when one hand 
touches another, and that he also speaks of a 
reversibility between different senses such 
as touch and vision. But these complications 
will have to be put aside and they do not 
disturb the line of argument. 
3 See VI 195/149, where Merleau-Ponty 
speaks of ideas lining the sensible. 
 
4 That Merleau-Ponty is serious about this 
point becomes especially clear in the 
institution lectures, where he writes that “the 
instituted has sense without me,” in the 
context of a discussion where time as 
“passivity-activity” is said to be the “very 
model of institution.” (Merleau-Ponty 
(2003a), 36; translations of this work, 
referenced below as IP, are from Merleau-
Ponty (Forthcoming), which also gives the 
French pagination.) This means that I am not 
the wholly active constituter of sense, for the 
institution of sense requires an activity that 
surpasses me.  
5 See especially the chapter “Le sentir” in 
PhP. 
6 Merleau-Ponty writes at OE 31-32/167 that 
“[t]here really is inspiration and expiration 
of Being, respiration in Being, action and 
passion so slightly discernible that one no 
longer knows who sees and who is seen, 
who paints and who is painted”—but a 
slight discernibility of activity and passivity 
remains. And at VI 318/265 he writes that 
“Circularity [of] speaking-listening, seeing-
being seen, perceiving-being perceived (it is 
because of it that it seems to us that 
perception forms itself in the things 
themselves)—–Activity=passivity.” 
(Merleau-Ponty’s emphases) But the equal 
sign here does not remove the incongruence 
between activity and passivity, since the 
topic is reversibility as an “act with two 
faces.” In fact, the ability to indicate, with 
the equal sign, that activity and passivity are 
counterparts or equals precisely depends on 
the two maintaining separate faces. This 
separation of activity and passivity is central 
to Merleau-Ponty’s lectures on passivity, 
where the course summary opens with the 
observation that “the explication of 
perceptual experience must make us 
acquainted with a genus of being with 
regard to which the subject is not sovereign, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
without yet the subject being inserted in it.” 
(IP, 267) Here he is broaching the need for 
an account of passivity as separate genus of 
being, that is not reducible to a lack of 
activity. 
the issues broached by Kant. Casey (1997) 
links Kant’s incongruent counterparts to 
issues of the body and place that are highly 
pertinent to the discussion of oriented space 
below. 
Also see the point from VI about the 
“fragmentation of being,” discussed in note 
11 below. Hass (1999) interprets 
reversibility in terms of the relation between 
figure and ground that is so central to PhP, 
and the point here is that an incogruency 
between figure and ground is requisite to the 
central role of the figure-ground structure, 
and that passivity serves as ground for 
perception as active figuration.  
8 See Nerlich (1991), 151 for an important 
suggestion about conceptual usage, viz. that 
something can be an incongruent 
counterpart if and only if it actually has a 
counterpart (as being a twin entails actually 
having a twin), whereas something on its 
own can have the property of being an 
enantiomorph. I.e., incongruent 
counterparthood is a dyadic property, 
whereas enantomorphood is monadic.  Here we are touching on a crucial issue 
broached by Lawlor (2006) in his discussion 
of “mixturism” in Merleau-Ponty, namely 
whether Merleau-Ponty maintains a gap 
between mixed terms such as subject and 
object. This gap, Lawlor argues, is crucial to 
a philosophy of immanence. Contra Lawlor 
(although Lawlor is not unambiguous about 
this), the claim here is that Merleau-Ponty 
does maintain such a gap, although since 
there is an affiliation across the gap (but not 
an underlying unity or ambiguous being) 
Merleau-Ponty will have a different 
ontology than those of Foucault and 
Deleuze, with whom Lawlor is contrasting 
Merleau-Ponty.  
9 It is wrong to say that the operation inflects 
being as perceiver or perceived, as if being 
is a purely invisible substratum that appears 
in one of two visible forms. The right-hand 
glove turned inside out is a left-hand glove, 
not the appearance of a right-hand glove; 
and the left- and right- hand gloves are not 
the two visible appearances of some 
underlying, ambiguous being that would be 
purely invisible (a non-handed version of a 
handed glove is impossible to visualize). To 
say that the counterparts seem incongruent is 
not to say that they are really two 
appearances of the same thing, but that, 
despite their own looks, the one counterpart 
can turn to the other. This point is at work in 
a passage from VI on the reversed glove, 
discussed here on page 2. The ontology of 
reversibility and écart is not an ontology of 
appearance. This intersects with Merleau-
Ponty’s ontological insistence on an 
invisible that is of the visible (see, e.g., VI 
247/300-1), internal to the visible, not 
behind it.  
For further discussion and argument 
that reversibility involves a reversible 
relation between activity and passivity, 
which does not, however, reduce the one to 
the other, see Morris (2008), Morris 
(Forthcoming).   
7 Kant’s three writings on this topic (“On the 
First Ground of the Distinction of Regions 
in Space,” a passage from his inaugural 
dissertation, and a passage from the 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics) 
are collected in van Cleve and Frederick 
(1991), which also gives invaluable context 
as well as collecting recent discussions of 
10 See Cintas (2007). 
11 I came across this passage in searching 
through VI after an insight into the above 
links between reversibility, the glove and 
chirality. Further research reveals numerous 
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passages where Merleau-Ponty links 
reversibility to mirror images, discussed 
below. Also see VI 327/274, which notes 
that experience of my body as seer 
“announces the view that the other acquires 
of it or that the mirror gives of it,” like an 
enantiomorph itself pointing to its 
counterpart, in the manner of “double 
representation” in the glove. 
24 Levin (2005), 5. 
25 See Neville (1976). 
26 Levin (1999), 140-1. 
27 See, e.g., Aristotle (2001). 
28 In PhP this inseparability first of all has to 
do with our directedness toward being, être 
au monde—but it also involves the 
directedness of the phenomenal field. In 
later work sens more clearly depends on a 
directedness of being itself, kin to the 
directedness of the phenomenal field. This 
especially apparent in Merleau-Ponty 
(2003a), which revives the field concept. 
12 Being does so in the way that a curved 
Riemannian space internally indicates its 
curvature. The space’s curvature need not be 
measured in a higher order space, it can be 
sensed by traversing a triangle within the 
space and adding up its internal angles. 
29 See, e.g., Mezey (1999), but see Mason 
(1991) for an earlier and different opinion 
that also links homochirality to a bias of the 
universe. Gardner (1979) draws an even 
earlier version of this connection.  
13 See the papers in van Cleve and Frederick 
(1991) for this issue. 
14 Merleau-Ponty (2003b), 224. 
15 See note 7. 
30 Levin (1999), 137. 16 Derrida (1981) demonstrates that 
meaningful difference in fact depends on a 
supplement that opens a shifting latitude of 
sense; pharmakon (the Greek term for drug, 
which can name both cure and poison, as in 
English), as reversing between cure and 
poison, exemplifies this latitude. 
31 Levin (2005), 6. Also see Brown, 
McCarthy and Wolpert (1991), whose model 
is referenced by Levin, and proposes that the 
internal establishment of asymmetry 
direction depends on a handed—but as yet 
unknown—molecule, named “F’ (because 
the letter is handed). Levin’s point is that it 
would still be necessary to ask how the 
direction of F’s asymmetry is established.  
17 See Pályi, Zucchi and Cagliotti (1999) and 
Marsh and Bock (1991) for collections of 
relatively recent work surveying the topics 
of chirality, homochirality and asymmetry in 
biology and biochemistry.  
32 The variant is known as the “Ozma 
problem,” which name comes from 
Gardner’s appropriation of the name of a 
contemporary project that was searching for 
signs of extra-terrestrial intelligence. The 
problem is articulated in chapter 18 of 
Gardner (1979), which is also an extremely 
helpful introduction to all the problems 
about asymmetry and mirror sense discussed 
below. This chapter of Gardner’s is also 
included in van Cleve and Frederick (1991), 
which includes extensive discussion of 
Gardner’s problem in relation to Kant. 
18 Quoted in Gardner (1979), 98. 
19 Bergson ([1907] 1998), 16, italics in 
original. 
20 See Nagata (1999). 
21 Properly: levo and dextro form, that is L-
amino acids and D-sugars. 
22 Gilat (1999). 
23 Neville (1976), chapter 1. Our bodies are 
thus “pseudosymmetrical.” 
 13
                                                                                                                                                                              
challenging introduction to topology and 
notions such as non-orientable spaces, see 
Weeks (2002). 
33 The problem of establishment here is 
really the problem of institution in IP. 
34 Lyre (2008) is very helpful in 
emphasizing this point, i.e., that the problem 
is not communicating a difference between 
left and right, but establishing which of a 
chiral pair is the left one. Lyre also gives a 
more abstract analysis of the problem by 
showing how we can communicate “up” and 
“front” by having the aliens construct dice 
and label the faces according to 
mathematical constraints (that opposite faces 
add up to 7), and then telling them about 
relations between various faces. But these 
constraints leave ambiguous the difference 
between left and right, i.e. there are two 
ways of arranging the die faces so that 
opposite faces total 7. Modern dice are all, 
by convention, left-handed (but note that 
calling them this is itself a convention). But 
there is no guarantee that the aliens would 
put together left-handed dice which could 
then show them which side is left. See 
Gardner (1979), 31-2 for the account of the 
chirality of dice. 
38 That is, a god above all perspective, could 
know that there is a difference between left 
and right, but not which hand is which. 
Interestingly, children also do not seem to 
see shapes in the same way as adults—they 
see their topological connectedness more 
than their figure—and this may be 
correlative to their inability to tell left hand 
figures from right. 
39 [Identifyin information removed.] 
40 Blakemore (2003), Blakemore, Bristow, 
Bird, Frith and Ward (2005) 
41 Armel and Ramachandran (2003), 
Botvinick (2004), Botvinick and Cohen 
(1998), Ehrsson, Holmes and Passingham 
(2005), Gallagher (2004). 
42 Sebanz, Bekkering and Knoblich (2006). 
43 Merleau-Ponty ([1941] 1965). 
44 Here we see the link between sense, 
geometry, institution, writing down, activity 
and passivity, i.e. between the projects of 
Merleau-Ponty (2003a) and Merleau-Ponty 
(2002). See Lawlor (2002) for an orientation 
to these issues. Likely Derrida’s work on the 
genesis of sense in Husserl becomes relevant 
at this point. 
35 For an extensive treatment of this issue, 
see the works collected in van Cleve and 
Frederick (1991), which includes the 
relevant works by Kant as well as Gardner, 
and commentary. Of these, Bennett (1991) 
develops the helpful tell vs. show 
distinction.  45 See Newton ([1687] 1999); this edition 
has an especially helpful scholarly 
apparatus. 
36 Indeed this means that the problem of 
chiral sense intersects with the problem of 
defining what chirality or this problem 
means in the first place, a point notable in 
the literature collected in van Cleve and 
Frederick (1991), which is constantly caught 
in deeply conceptual and slippery matters. 
46 Here there is a link to the crucial theme of 
expression in Merleau-Ponty.  
47 Soderbergh (2007). 
48 There is an obvious complication here 
methodological, as to how we can introduce 
this empirical datum from the everyday 
attitude into a transcendentally reduced 
phenomenological attitude, but likely we can 
take care of that by noting that it is precisely 
37 For these points, see the various works in 
van Cleve and Frederick (1991), of which 
Gardner’s piece and Nerlich (1991) are 
especially helpful. For a delightful but 
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the everyday sense “exactingly 
manufactured dies” that is being bracketed, 
and that it is this sense that we are trying to 
described as phenomenologists. This leads 
to the interesting point that another reason 
why the die is apt as example is because its 
everyday sense includes the sense of a 
community, exactness, objectivity, and so 
on. The sense of it as “exactingly 
manufactured die” is reciprocal with the 
sense of the community through which alone 
exactness, objectivity, etc., can have a sense. 
49 I am articulating these points with Husserl 
([1931] 1991) in mind. On the die’s 
reference to the community, see note 48. 
50 For these issues of sense genesis in 
Husserl, see “The Origin of Geometry” in 
Husserl (1970) and also Husserl (1998). 
Merleau-Ponty (2002) gives an extensive 
study of this problem in Husserl, and Lawlor 
(2002) gives an excellent introduction to and 
context for this issue in its relation to the 
“creative operation.” Sense genesis is also 
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